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Abstract
Using two types of overlapping generations (OLG)model, we show that involuntary
unemployment is in a Nash equilibrium of a game with a firm and consumers, and
we can achieve full-employment by fiscal policy financed by seignorage not tax. Once
we achieve it, it is maintained without government expenditure. Also we show that
a fall in the nominal wage rate may not decrease involuntary unemployment.
1. Introduction
This paper is a sequel of the previous paper (Tanaka (2020)) in which we have analyzed
the existence of involuntary unemployment under perfect competition. In this paper us-
ing very simple models we study the existence of involuntary unemployment from the
game theoretic view point, and examine whether involuntary unemployment is in a Nash
equilibrium of a game with a firm and consumers. Also we consider realization of full-
employment by fiscal policy. Involuntary unemployment in this paper is a situationwhere
workers are willing to work at the market wage or just below but are prevented by factors
beyond their control, mainly, deficiency of aggregate demand1.
We use two types of overlapping generations (OLG) model simplifying and extending
the model in Otaki (2007), Otaki (2009), Otaki (2011) and Otaki (2015). He assumes in-
divisibility (or inelasticity) of individual labor supply. If labor supply is indivisible, it may
be 1 or 02. The first model, which is a two generations OLG model with pay-as-you-go
pension system, used in the next section is the following economy.
1. There are one firm and one good. One unit of the good is produced by one unit of
labor.
2. There are two younger (working) consumerswhomay be employed or not employed
by the firm. An unemployed consumer consumes the good by borrowing money
from an employed consumer against pension.
3. There are two older (retired) consumers who may be employed or not employed by
the firm when they are young.
4. There is a pay-as-you-go pension system for older consumers.
5. There may exist government expenditure.
Using thismodel wewill show the existence of involuntary unemployment in aNash equi-
librium, and realization of full-employment by fiscal policy financed by seignorage. Once
we achieve it, it is maintained without government expenditure.
The secondmodel, which is a three generations OLGmodel with childhood consumers
without pension, used in Section 3 is the following economy.
1. There are one firm and one good. One unit of the good is produced by one unit of
labor.
2. There are two younger (working) consumerswhomay be employed or not employed
by the firm.
3. There are two older (retired) consumers who may be employed or not employed by
the firm when they are young.
1About the studies of involuntary unemployment without wage rigidity please see, for example, Umada
(1997) and Lavoie (2001) .
2About indivisibility of labor supply please see Hansen (1985).
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4. There are two childhood consumers who consume the good by borrowing money
from consumers of the younger generation. Their consumptions are constant.
5. There may exist government expenditure.
Using thismodel wewill show the existence of involuntary unemployment in aNash equi-
librium, and realization of full-employment by fiscal policy financed by seignorage. Once
we achieve it, it is maintained without government expenditure. We also show that a fall
in the nominal wage rate may not decrease involuntary unemployment.
In both models younger consumers split their income in half between consumption in
Period 1 and consumption in Period 2. Taxes (for unemployment benefit and pay-as-you-
go pension) and money (lending or borrowing) are evaluated by the good.
In Appendix we will examine the effect of a fall in the nominal wage rate in a three
generations model with pay-as-you-go pension.
2. Two generations model with pay-as-you-go pension
We consider the following model.
1. The model is a two generations OLG model. Consumers live over two periods, Pe-
riod 1 and Period 2. In Period 1 (younger period, working period) they can work
and earn the wages. They buy and consume the good by wages. In Period 2 (older
period, retired period) they buy and consume the good by their savings and the pay-
as-you-go pension. The good can be consumed by any unit, that is, a consumer can
consume, for example, 0.1 units of the good.
2. There is one good and one firm. The firm produces one unit of the good by one
unit of labor. Though there is only one firm, it behaves competitively. Let 𝑤 be the
nominal wage rate and 𝑝 be the price of the good. Then, 𝑝 = 𝑤, and the real wage
rate is one.
3. There are two younger consumers. If a consumer is employed, he supplies one unit
of labor, receives the wage, consumes the good, pays tax for pay-as-you-go pension
for consumers in the older generation, lendsmoney to an unemployed younger con-
sumer (if involuntary unemployment exists) and saves the remaining income.
If a consumer is not employed, his income is zero. However, he can receive pay-as-
you-go pension after retirement, so he consumes the good in his Period 1 by borrow-
ing money from an employed younger consumer against pension.
They determine their consumption and labor supply at the beginning of their Period
1.
4. There are two older consumers. If a consumer was employed in his Period 1, he con-
sumes the good by his savings and the pay-as-you-go pension. If he is not employed,
he consumes by only the pay-as-you-go pension, and repays his debt in Period 1.
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2.1. Case 1: A game without government expenditure
Assume that there exists no government expenditure. Let us consider the following pair
of strategies of the firm and the younger consumers at a steady state. The strategies of the
consumers are derived from their utility maximization over two periods. Suppose that the
firm employs one younger consumer, and the other younger consumer is not employed.
Let 0 < 𝑡 ≤ 0.25.
1. Firm: employs one younger consumer and produces one unit of the good.
2. Employed younger consumer: supplies one unit of labor, receiveswage𝑤, consumes
0.5− 𝑡2 units of the good, pays 2𝑡 units of tax for pay-as-you-go pension for the older
generation, lends 𝑡2 units of money to the unemployed younger consumer, and saves
the rest of the income (0.5 − 2𝑡).
3. Unemployed younger consumer: consumes 𝑡2 units of the good by borrowingmoney
from the employed younger consumer against pension in the next period.
Since we consider a steady state, one older generation consumer consumes 0.5 − 𝑡2 units
of the good by his savings including lending to an unemployed consumer (0.5 − 32 𝑡) and
the pay-as-you-go pension (𝑡). The other older generation consumer consumes 𝑡2 units of
the good by the pay-as-you go pension (𝑡) repaying the debt ( 𝑡2). Their total consumption
is 0.5. The total demand for the good is one unit which is equal to the supply.
Is this pair of strategies in a Nash equilibrium?
1. Firm: given the consumption behavior of two younger consumers, employment of
one unit of labor and production of une unit of the good are optimal.
2. Employed younger consumer: given the behavior of the firm and the unemployed
consumer, supply of one unit of labor and 0.5− 𝑡2 units of consumption are optimal.
3. Unemployed younger consumer: given the behavior of the firm and the employed
consumer, 𝑡2 units of consumption is optimal.
In this case there exists one unit of involuntary unemployment.
2.2. Case 2: A game with government expenditure in Case 1
Now we consider 0.5 units of the government expenditure which is spent on the good
produced by the firm. The state is not a steady state. The government expenditure should
be financed by seignorage not by tax. Suppose that two consumers are employed by the
firm. Let 0 < 𝑡 ≤ 0.25 again. Consider the following pair of strategies.
1. Firm: employs two younger consumers and produces two units of the good.
2. Employed younger consumer 1: supplies one unit of labor, receives wage 𝑤, con-
sumes 0.5 units of the good, pays 𝑡 units of tax for pay-as-you-go pension for the
older generation, and saves the rest of the income (0.5 − 𝑡).
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3. Employed younger consumer 2: supplies one unit of labor, receives wage 𝑤, con-
sumes 0.5 units of the good, pays 𝑡 units of tax for pay-as-you-go pension for the
older generation, and saves the rest of the income (0.5 − 𝑡).
One older generation consumer consumes 0.5 − 𝑡2 units of the good. The other older gen-
eration consumer consumes 𝑡2 units of the good. Their total consumption is 0.5. The
demand by younger consumers is one, and the government’s demand is 0.5. Therefore,
the total demand for the good is two units which is equal to the supply. Similarly to the
previous case, we can verify that this pair of strategies are optimal for the firm and for each
younger consumer given strategies of other players. This case means that we can achieve
full-employment by the fiscal policy.
Without government expenditure, above pair of strategies can not be in a Nash equilib-
rium because consumption of the older generation consumers is insufficient. The multi-
plier of the government expenditure is two.
Full employment steady state In the next period above pair of strategies without
government expenditure maintains full-employment because the total consumption of the
older generation is one unit of the good in the new steady state, 0.5 for each older con-
sumer.
3. Three generations model with childhood period
Next we consider the following model.
1. The model is a three generations OLG model. Consumers live over three periods,
Periods 0, 1 and 2. In Period 1 they can work and earn the wages. They buy and
consume the good by wages. In Period 2 they buy and consume the good by their
savings. In Period 0 (childhood period) they consume the good by borrowingmoney
from consumers of the previous generation. They must repay the debts in the next
period. However, if a consumer is not employed, he can not repay the debt. Then,
he receives unemployment benefit which is covered by tax paid by an employed
consumer of the same generation. The good can be consumed by any unit.
2. There is one good and one firm. The firm produces one unit of the good by one
unit of labor. Though there is only one firm, it behaves competitively. Let 𝑤 be the
nominal wage rate and 𝑝 be the price of the good. Then, 𝑝 = 𝑤, and the real wage
rate is one.
3. There are two younger consumers. If a consumer is employed, he supplies one unit
of labor, receives the wage, consumes the good, pays tax for unemployment benefit
for an unemployed consumer in the same generation, and saves the remaining in-
come. If he is not employed, his income is zero, and then his consumption is zero.
His debt due to consumption in Period 0 is repaid by unemployment benefit.
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They determine their consumption and labor supply at the beginning of their Period
1.
4. There are two older consumers. If a consumer was employed in his Period 1, he
consumes the good by his savings. If he is not employed, his consumption is zero.
5. There are two childhood consumers. Their consumptions are constant.
3.1. Case 3: A game without government expenditure
Assume that there exists no government expenditure. Let us consider the following pair
of strategies of the firm and the younger consumers at a steady state. The strategies of the
consumers are derived from their utility maximization over two periods (Periods 1 and
2). Consumption of each consumer in the childhood period is constant. Suppose that the
firm employs one younger consumer, and the other younger consumer is not employed.
Let 0 < 𝜎 ≤ 0.5. The total consumption of two childhood consumers is 2𝜎, 𝜎 for each
consumer.
1. Firm: employs one younger consumer and produces one unit of the good.
2. Employed younger consumer: supplies one unit of labor, receiveswage𝑤, consumes
0.5−𝜎 units of the good, repays𝜎 units of debt, pays𝜎 units of tax for unemployment
benefit, and saves the rest of his income (0.5 − 𝜎).
3. Unemployed younger consumer: consumption is zero. He repays the debt by un-
employment benefit.
Since we consider a steady state, one older generation consumer consumes 0.5 − 𝜎 units
of the good by his savings. Consumption of the other older generation consumer is zero.
Their total consumption is 0.5 − 𝜎. The childhood consumers consume 2𝜎 units of the
good in total. The total demand for the good is one unit which is equal to the supply.
Is this pair of strategies in a Nash equilibrium?
1. Firm: given the consumption behavior of two younger consumers, employment of
one unit of labor and production of une unit of the good are optimal.
2. Employed younger consumer: given the behavior of the firm and the unemployed
consumer, supply of one unit of labor and 0.5−𝜎 units of consumption are optimal.
3. Unemployed younger consumer: given the behavior of the firm and the employed
consumer, zero consumption is optimal.
In this case there exists one unit of involuntary unemployment.
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Fall in the nominal wage rate Proposition 2.1 in Otaki (2016) says
Suppose that the nominal wage sags. Then, as far as its indirect effects on the
aggregate demand are negligible, this only results in causing a proportionate
fall in the price level. In other words, a fall in the nominal wage never rescues
workers who are involuntarily unemployed.
However, indirect effects on aggregate demand due to a fall in the nominal wage rate may
exist. We use the following notation.
𝑀: The total savings of older consumers.
It is equal to the total demand of older consumers. It is an asset.
𝐷: Debt of a younger consumer due to his consumption in the childhood period.
𝑅: Unemployment benefit, 𝑅 = 𝐷.
?ˆ?: Consumption in the childhood period of a next generation consumer.
Since in our model an employed younger consumer splits his income in half between
consumption in Period 1 and consumption in Period 2, the total demand of younger con-
sumers is
1
2
[𝑤 − 𝐷 − 𝑅] =
1
2
𝑤 − 𝐷,
and the total demand for the good is
1
2
𝑤 − 𝐷 + 𝑀 + 2?ˆ?.
We can think that the real values of 𝑤 and ?ˆ? are invariant to price changes. On the other
hand, the nominal values of𝑀 and 𝐷 do not change. Thus, a fall in the nominal wage rate
increases (decreases) total demand for the good if
𝑀 − 𝐷 > 0(< 0).
In our mode, since 𝑚 = 0.5 − 𝜎 and 𝐷 = 𝜎, this is equivalent to
0.5 − 2𝜎 > 0(< 0).
Therefore, if 𝜎 > 0.25, a fall in the nominal wage rate decreases the total demand for the
good, and increases involuntary unemployment.
The discussion here is from the different perspectives of the real balance effect forwhich
the argument was fought by Pigou (1943) and Kalecki (1944).
3.2. Case 4: A game with government expenditure in Case 3
Now we consider 0.5 units of the government expenditure which is spent on the good
produced by the firm. The state is not a steady state. The government expenditure should
be financed by seignorage not by tax. Suppose that two consumers are employed by the
firm. Consider the following pair of strategies.
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1. Firm: employs two younger consumers and produces two units of the good.
2. Employed younger consumer 1: supplies one unit of labor, receives wage 𝑤, con-
sumes 0.5 − 𝜎2 units of the good, repays 𝜎 units of debt, and saves the rest of his
income (0.5 − 𝜎2 ).
3. Employed younger consumer 2: supplies one unit of labor, receives wage 𝑤, con-
sumes 0.5 − 𝜎2 units of the good, repays 𝜎 units of debt, and saves the rest of his
income (0.5 − 𝜎2 ).
One older generation consumer consumes 0.5 − 𝜎 units of the good by his savings. The
consumption of the other older generation consumer is zero. Their total consumption is
0.5−𝜎. The total demand by younger consumers is 1−𝜎, The total demand by the child-
hood consumers is 2𝜎, and the government’s demand is 0.5. Therefore, the total demand
for the good is two units which is equal to the supply. Similarly to the previous case, we can
verify that this pair of strategies are optimal for the firm and for each younger consumer
given strategies of other players. This case means that we can achieve full-employment by
the fiscal policy. The multiplier of the government expenditure is two.
Without government expenditure, above pair of strategies can not be in a Nash equilib-
rium because consumption of the older generation is insufficient.
Full employment steady state In the next period above pair of strategies without
government expenditure maintains full-employment because the total consumption of the
older generation is 1 − 𝜎 units of the good in the new steady state.
4. Concluding Remark
In this paper labor supply is indivisible. However, because the real wage rate is constant,
even if labor supply depends on the real wage rate, it is constant. Under increasing or
decreasing returns to scale, the real wage rate and labor supply may not be constant. Even
in such cases we think the analysis can proceed in the similar way.
One drawback of this paper is that the production of the good is carried out solely by
labor. I would like to consider a model that includes capital in future research.
A. Appendix: About a fall in the nominal wage rate in
a three generations model with pay-as-you-go
pension
If there is a pay-as-you-go pension in Case 3, the following pair of strategies is in a Nash
equilibrium. 𝑡 and 𝜎 mean the same thing as before. Let 0 < 𝑡 ≤ 0.25 and 0 < 𝜎 + 𝑡 ≤ 0.5.
1. Firm: employs one younger consumer and produces one unit of the good.
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2. Employed younger consumer: supplies one unit of labor, receiveswage𝑤, consumes
0.5−𝜎− 𝑡2 units of the good, repays𝜎 units of debt, pays𝜎 units of tax for unemploy-
ment benefit, pays 2𝑡 units of tax for pay-as-you-go pension, lends 𝑡2 units of money
to the unemployed younger consumer and saves the rest of his income (0.5−𝜎−2𝑡).
3. Unemployed younger consumer: consumes 𝑡2 units of the good by borrowingmoney
from the employed younger consumer against pension in the next period. He repays
the debt due to consumption in Period 0 by unemployment benefit.
One older generation consumer consumes 0.5 − 𝜎 − 𝑡2 units of the good. The other older
generation consumer consumes 𝑡2 units of the good. Their total consumption is 0.5 − 𝜎.
The total demand of younger consumers is also 0.5 − 𝜎. The total demand of childhood
consumers is 2𝜎. Thus, the total demand for the good is one unit which is equal to the
supply.
LetΦ be the pay-as-you-go pension for an older consumer, Ψ be the tax for the pension
and Φˆ be the pay-as-you-go pension for a younger consumer when he retires. Then,
Ψ = 2Φ
in this case. The total demand for the good by younger consumers is
1
2
[𝑤 − 2𝐷 − 2Φ + Φˆ] +
1
2
Φˆ =
1
2
𝑤 − 𝐷 −Φ + Φˆ.
1
2Φˆ is demand by an unemployed younger consumer. The total demand for the good is
1
2
𝑤 − 𝐷 −Φ + Φˆ + 𝑀 + 2?ˆ?.
𝑀 includes the pay-as-you-go pension for older consumers 2Φ. Thus, the net savings of
older consumers is 𝑀 − 2Φ.
We can think that the real values of 𝑤, ?ˆ?, Φ and Φˆ are invariant to price changes. On
the other hand, the nominal values of 𝑀 − 2Φ and 𝐷 do not change. Hence, a fall in the
nominal wage rate increases (decreases) total demand for the good if
𝑀 − 2Φ − 𝐷 > 0(< 0). (1)
In our model the consumption of an older consumer who was employed in Period 1 is
0.5 − 𝜎 − 𝑡2 and that of an older consumer who is not employed is
𝑡
2 . Thus, 𝑀 = 0.5 − 𝜎.
Therefore, (1) is equivalent to
0.5 − 𝜎 − 2𝑡 − 𝜎 = 0.5 − 2𝜎 − 2𝑡 > 0(< 0).
Hence, if 𝜎 + 𝑡 > 0.25, a fall in the nominal wage rate decreases the total demand for the
good, and increases involuntary unemployment.
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